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NOTES
INSURANCE LIQUIDATIONS: A PROPOSED AMENDMENT
TO THE McCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT
THE assets of insolvent multi-state insurance corporations are neither uni-
formly nor equitably distributed under the existing system of state liquida-
tion.1 Divergent state views on the status of foreign receivers have defeated
the proper aim of insurance liquidations-equitable distribution of assets
among all policyholders and creditors with a minimum of waste and expense.2
Formerly, all states applied the rule that an equity receiver did not have title
to an insolvent's assets. 3 He was therefore without standing to sue or be sued
outside the jurisdiction appointing him, and foreign states would recognize
him as a matter of comity only when recognition did not adversely affect local
interests.4 To avoid this rule, many states enacted laws creating "statutory"
receivers who would take legal title to the insolvent's assets.r And though in
1934 the Supreme Court held that no state could dishonor the title of a foreign
statutory receiver,6 it one year later upheld the constitutionality of state policy
1. "The existing system of liquidating insolvent insurance corporations doing business
in many states is intolerable in its inefficiency, its expensiveness, its delays and
its injustice."
Vance, Interstate Aspects of the Liquidation of Insolvent Insurance Corporations, 6 Asso-
cIATION OF LIFE INSURANCE COUNSEL PROCEEDINGS 343, 354 (1935). See also Van Schaick,
Should Insolvent Interstate Insurance Companies Be Administered in Bankruptcy?, A2
CORPORATE REORGANIZATIONS 227 (1939).
2. See Pensinger v. Pacific States Life Ins. Co., 25 F. Supp. 295, 297 (E.D. Mo.
1938); Motlow v. Southern Holding & Securities Corp., 95 F.2d 721, 724 (8th Cir.
1938); GLENN, LIQIIDATION § 3 (1935).
As used in this Note "foreign" refers to other jurisdictions within the United States
and "alien" denotes jurisdictions outside the United States. For a discussion of the prob-
lems in liquidating insolvent alien insurance corporations doing business within the United
States, see Bennett, Liquidation of Insurance Companies, 4 EXAIIINATION OF INSURANCE
COmPANIES 416-18 (1954).
3. Great Western Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Harris, 198 U.S. 561 (1905); Security
Trust Co. v. Dodd, Mead & Co., 173 U.S. 624 (1899); Humphreys v. Hopkins, 81 Cal.
551, 22 Pac. 892 (1889).
4. Booth v. Clark, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 321 (1855) ; Hurd v. Elizabeth, 41 N.J.L. 1
(1879); Gilman v. Ketcham, 84 Wis. 60, 54 N.W. 395 (1893). See also Boulware v.
Davis, 90 Ala. 207, 8 So. 84 (1890). But see Security Trust Co. v. Dodd, Mead & Co.,
supra note 3 (non-resident creditor recognized ahead of foreign receiver).
5. The statutory receiver is usually the State Superintendent of Insurance or his
equivalent. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6037 (Supp. 1955); MiNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60.875, pt. 18 (Supp. 1956) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.650 (Supp. 1956) ; PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, § 206 (Purdon Supp. 1956). For discussion of these statutes, see People ex rel.
Jones v. Chicago Lloyds, 391 Ill. 492, 496-99, 63 N.E.2d 479, 483 (1945).
6. Clark v. Williard, 292 U.S. 112 (1934). The Court made clear that foreign liquida-
subordinating his claims to attachments by local creditors. 7 Protected by the
latter decision, many states postpone recognition of a foreign receiver's claims
until all claims of local creditors have been satisfied.8 Thus the amount a
given creditor will receive depends on the extent of local assets and the number
tors vested by statute with legal title could not be deemed equity receivers and denied
capacity to sue. Id. at 121-22. See Note, 48 HARv. L. REv. 835 (1935).
This decision resolved a conflict on the comparative legal rights of statutory and equity
receivers. In Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U.S. 222 (1880), the Supreme Court held that statutory
liquidators appointed to wind up insolvent corporations had standing to sue in place of the
corporation. But in dictum the Court stated that by allowing the corporation to transact
business within its jurisdiction, the state assented to all laws of the state appointing the
receiver including those governing the administration of assets in liquidation. Id. at 225-
26. This led to a rule of law in many states allowing a foreign statutory receiver to re-
cover before local attaching creditors as a matter of right. Cogliano v. Ferguson, 245
Mass. 364, 139 N.E. 527 (1923); Kinsler v. Casualty Co., 103 Neb. 382, 172 N.W. 33
(1919); Bockover v. Life Ass'n, 77 Va. 85 (1883). But Relfe v. Rundle was viewed
differently by courts still desiring to favor local interests. A few held that the receiver's
appointment by an equity court, even though ordered by statute, made him a chancery
receiver instead of a statutory successor. Mieyr v. Federal Surety Co., 94 Mont. 508, 23
P.2d 959 (1933), rev'd sub norn. Clark v. Williard, supra. See Note, 48 HARv. L. REV.
835 (1935). Other courts held title vested by statute without extraterritorial effect. Alwart
Bros. Coal Co. v. Pittsburgh Fire Ins. Co., 253 Ill. App. 361 (1929) ; Gray v. Covert, 25
Ind. App. 561, 58 N.E. 731 (1900) ; Zacher v. Fidelity Trust and Safety Vault Co., 109
Ky. 441, 59 S.W. 493 (1900) ; see 3 BEALE, CONFLIcr OF LAWS § 560A.4 (1935). And
others held they would favor local creditors over a foreign receiver irrespective of the
latter's standing. Hieronymous Bros. v. China Mut. Ins. Co., 6 Ala. App. 97, 60 So. 452
(1912) ; Lackmann v. Supreme Council, 142 Cal. 22, 75 Pac. 583 (1904).
7. Clark v. Williard, 294 U.S. 211 (1935).
In the first Clark v. Williard decision, supra note 6, the Supreme Court refused to
decide this issue. Refusal was based on the possibility that the state court's grant of pre-
cedence to local attachments was based on failure to construe correctly the status of the
foreign liquidator. Id. at 122. On remand to determine the application of state law to the
receiver as the holder of title to the corporation's assets, the state court interpreted state
law as favoring local attachments. Mieyr v. Federal Surety Co., 97 Mont. 503, 34 P.2d
982 (1934). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although a receiver has title and
thus must be recognized, the states have absolute power over disposition of property
within their jurisdiction and may subordinate the receiver's claims to those arising under
valid local attachments. Clark v. Williard II, supra at 213. For criticism of this decision,
see Vance, supra note 1, at 343-44; GLENN, LIQUIDATION § 591 (1935) ; Note, 48 HARv.
L. REv. 835 (1935).
8. Van Schaick v. Parsons, 11 F. Supp. 654 (D. Mont. 1935) ; Hill v. Caldarera, 197
Ark. 659, 124 S.W.2d 825 (1939); Davis v. Amra Grotto, 169 Tenn. 564, 89 S.W.2d 754
(1936). The rule in these and other states that an attachment levied subsequent to the
foreign statutory receiver's appointment takes precedence over the claims of the receiver
is still in effect. See Annot., 98 A.L.R. 351, 374-75 (1935).
The doctrine of Clark v. WVilliard 11, is not limited to those attachments obtained by
local creditors. Local attachments are upheld even if obtained by foreign creditors. Indeed
it would be unconstitutional for a state to give attachments by their own citizens greater
effect than those of foreign citizens. See Blake v. MeClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898); 3
BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 560A.2 (1935). But a state could probably discriminate on
the basis of residence. Thus it could refuse to recognize the attachments of a non-resident,
whether or not a citizen of a foreign state. See Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
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and size of local claims, regardless of what assets or claims may exist outside
the stateY On the other hand, states favoring ratable distribution of assets
among all creditors, foreign or local, do not discriminate between the claims
of foreign receivers and those of local creditors.10 Absent reciprocity, how-
ever, such a policy disfavors local claimants.
Past attempts to eliminate the inequitable distribution inevitably resulting
from liquidation of insurance corporations with assets in states following these
different policies have been unsuccessful. Both uniform state legislation and
inclusion of insurance companies under the Federal Bankruptcy Act have been
suggested as solutions to the problem." A Uniform Insurer's Liquidation
Act, providing for partially ratable distribution of the insolvent's assets, was
drafted in 1939.12 But the act has been adopted by only 16 states, and no
279 U.S. 377, 387 (1929) (limiting doctrine of Blake v. McClung) ; La Tourette v. Mc-
Master, 248 U.S. 465 (1919).
Saving local assets for local claimants may be defended on the ground that one state
should not be forced to accept the priorities and methods of distribution of another. Cf.
Clark v. Williard, 294 U.S. 211 (1935). This reasoning, if supporting current practices,
would clearly not justify local favoritism under a uniform system of liquidation.
9. Comment, 36 MQ. L. REv. 383, 389 (1953).
10. MbDonald v. Pacific States Life Ins. Co., 344 Mo. 1, 124 S.W.2d 1157 (1939)
(discussing case law in the field) ; Martyne v. American Union Fire Ins. Co., 216 N.Y. 183,
110 N.E. 502 (1915) ; Pink v. Hanby, 220 N.C. 667, 18 S.E.2d 127 (1942). Some courts
require the receiver to guarantee in some manner that local creditors will be given equal
treatment with all other creditors when the assets are distributed. Buswell v. Order of
the Iron Hall, 161 Mass. 224, 36 N.E. 1065 (1894) ; Engineering Co. v. Perryman Elec.
Co., 113 N.J. Eq. 255, 166 Ati. 461 (Ch. 1.933) ; Bockover v. Life Ass'n, 77 Va. 85 (1883).
11. Appointing a federal equity receiver may be considered another solution. Under
existing law, such a receiver will be appointed only if a federal question is presented or
the requirements of diversity jurisdiction can be met. 7 MooRE, FF DMAL PRACCE ff 66.06
(1956). However, once appointed, the federal receiver will be discharged if the Super-
intendent of Insurance in the insolvent's domiciliary state advises the appointing court
that the state wishes to liquidate the insolvent. Refusal to continue the exercise of federal
jurisdiction in such cases is based on the need for harmony in federal-state relationships.
Penn Gen. Cas. Co. v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294 U.S. 189 (1935) ; cf. Pennsyl-
vania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935) (state controlled building and loan associations).
Moreover, the federal receiver will be able to hold ancillary proceedings only if the
courts in the ancillary state have not first taken jurisdiction over local property. For the
first court to gain constructive possession of the assets has exclusive jurisdiction over
their administration. The federal receiver will be able to conduct ancillary proceedings
only if the state court chooses to relinquish its jurisdiction. Penn Gen. Cas. Co. v. Penn-
sylvania ex rel. Schnader, szapra; Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, 262 U.S. 77
(1923). See also Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U.S. 36 (1928).
In the recent insolvency of the Inland Empire Insurance Co., the federal receiver has
been able to marshal assets in sixteen of the twenty-one states in which Inland did busi-
ness. In the other states, where jurisdiction over the insolvent's property was first
assumed by the state courts, distribution will be made through independent receiverships.
Brief for Receiver, p. 7, Inland Empire Ins. Co. v. Freed, 239 F.2d 289 (10th Cir. 1956).
A system of multiple receiverships is highly undesirable. See note 49 infrca and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of ancillary federal receiverships, see note 50 infra.
12. Reprinted in 9A UNmFoam! LAws ANN. 151-59 (hereinafter cited as UILA). The
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Act in 1939.
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substantial prospects of future adoption are apparent. 13 Furthermore, some
adopting states made substantive changes limiting the act's uniformity.14 Non-
uniform as well as partially adopted, the UILA falls short of its goal.15 More-
over, Congress has steadfastly refused to consider an amendment making in-
surance companies subject to the Bankruptcy Act.'6 Criticized as the result
of insurance industry pressure against federal regulation, 17 this refusal has
been rationalized on the grounds that insurance corporations, like banks and
other institutions greatly affected with the public interest, should not be
allowed continued existence after insolvency through discharge in bankruptcy.' 8
Id. at 148. The UILA treatment of statutory deposits precludes a fully ratable distribu-
tion. See note 39 infra.
13. See 9A UNrFoam LAws ANN. 46 (Supp. 1956). Colorado, not listed in the table,
also has enacted the UILA. CoLo. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-18-1 to 12 (Supp. 1955).
In the first eleven years after its drafting (1939-1950), fourteen states adopted the
UILA, among them the commercially significant states of Illinois, New York, Ohio and
Massachusetts. In the last seven years only one state besides Colorado, New Mexico, has
adopted the act. 9A UNiFomt LAws ANN. 46 (Supp. 1956).
14. Illinois, for example, has made important changes in almost every section of the
UILA. For a complete listing of statutory changes in all states, see the statutory notes
following each section of UILA.
15. The UILA is based entirely on the notion of reciprocity among adopting states.
Id. at 151-59. It can operate effectively only when followed by all states in which the in-
solvent did business. See Inland Empire Ins. Co. v. Freed, 239 F.2d 289, 293 (10th Cir.
1956) ; Martin v. General Am. Cas. Co., 226 La. 481, 76 So. 2d 537 (1954) (UILA pro-
visions held not in force because one of the two states involved had not adopted the act).
But see Rosen v. Massachusetts Acc. Co., 282 N.Y. 447, 26 N.E.2d 972 (1940).
Even where no question of reciprocity under the UILA is involved, inequitable distri-
bution is common. See Ace Grain Co. v. Rhode Island Ins. Co., 107 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.
N.Y.), aff'd, 199 F.2d 758 (2d Cir. 1952) (resolution of procedural difficulties arising
under narrow construction of UILA enabled equitable distribution, but at expense of costly
litigation) ; note 39 supra. For a general discussion of the shortcomings of the UILA, see
Bennett, supra note 2, at 426.
16. See Vance, supra note 1, at 355 (this solution "the only adequate and available
remedy"); Van Schaick, supra note 1, at 227 (same) ; see also MooRE, BANKRUPTCY
MANUAL 1104 n.9 (1939).
Congress, however, when devising relief for distressed railroad corporations, did not
even consider the situation of insurance companies. Vance, supra note 1, at 345.
17. Ibid. When the industry in this country was still in its infancy, and there was no
widespread fear of federal control, insurance corporations could go through bankruptcy
under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867. 14 STAT. 517, c. 176. See also Knickerbocker Ins. Co.
v. Comstock, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 258 (1872).
18. 6 Am. JuR., Bankruptcy § 114 (1950). See also Brief for Receiver, p. 8, Inland
Empire Ins. Co. v. Freed, 239 F.2d 289 (10th Cir. 1956). Banks, railroads, building and
loan associations and municipal corporations are also excluded from bankruptcy. 30 STAT.
547 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 22(a) (1952). The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 origi-
nally excluded all corporations from voluntary bankruptcy, and only manufacturing, trad-
ing, printing, publishing and mercantile corporations could be made involuntary bank-
rupts. 30 STAT. 547. Congressional opposition to allowing voluntary bankruptcy to any
corporation was intense. 30 CONG. Rac. 787-90 (1897); 28 CONG. REc. 4679-83 (1896).
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While this explanation is of dubious validity, it continues to have significant
weight with Congress.1 9
Since uniform legislation and amendment to the Bankruptcy Act were last
actively urged, a new possibility for curing the inequity of insurance liquida-
tions, direct federal regulation without resort to the Bankruptcy Act, has arisen.
but Congress has not acted. In 1944 the Supreme Court reversed its long
standing position and held insurance companies subject to federal regulation
under the commerce power. 20 However, Congress almost immediately passed
the McCarran-Ferguson Act which, while placing the industry within the
scope of the antitrust laws, the National Labor Relations Act and the Fair
Labor Standards Act, left all other control over the industry to the states."
Liquidation was included, doubtless because the problem of insolvencies had
Voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy were provided for most corporations by the 1910
amendment to the act. 36 STAT. 839 (1910). However, public service corporations rc-
mained excluded. Ibid.
Since insurance corporations are state regulated, it may be argued that insurance
liquidations should also be a state function and thus not made subject to the Bankruptcy
Act. However there seems to be no reason why regulation and liquidation cannot be
separated. Other state regulated businesses, such as public utilities, are liquidated under
the Bankruptcy Act. 1 REmiNGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 101 (1950).
19. Inclusion under the Bankruptcy Act need not entail discharge and continued
existence. The Constitution is silent on discharge in bankruptcy. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8,
cf. 4. When the Constitution was ratified, bankruptcy was more for the benefit of creditors
than debtors, and discharge was regarded with suspicion. The first Bankruptcy Act, Act
of April 14, 1800, c. 19, 2 STAT. 19, did not contain a discharge provision as that term is
understood today. 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ff 0.04 (1956) ; 7 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY
§§ 2993-95 (1955).
Nevertheless, the discharge provision has become so intertwined with the act as to
appear inseparable from it. Id. § 2996. See also In re Warner-Quinlan Co., 17 F. Supp.
659, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1936). This phenomenon may help to explain the policy against allow-
ing public service corporations to go through bankruptcy despite the fact that a discharged
corporation is in no economic position to resume business. GLENN, LIgUIDATION § 435
(1935). The treatment of national banks illustrates Congress' unwillingness to grant
discharges to public service corporations. See 19 STAT. 63 (1876), 12 U.S.C. §§ 191, 197
(1952) ; REv. STAT. §§ 5234-38 (1875), 12 U.S.C. §§ 192-96 (1952) ; 48 STAT. 193 (1933),
12 U.S.C. § 197(a) (1.952) ; 24 STAT. 8 (1886), 12 U.S.C. §§ 198-200 (1952). National
banks are liquidated, but not discharged, under these special provisions of the Banking
Act.
20. United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). This
decision in effect overruled a series of earlier cases holding insurance not to be in inter-
state commerce and hence not subject to direct federal control. See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868) ; cases collected in United States v. Southeastern Under-
writers Ass'n, supra at 567.
21. 59 STAT. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1952). Industry pressure was in-
fluential in causing passage of the act. See, e.g., Harrington, An Exploration of the
Effects of the SEUA Decision, 261 INs. L.J. 590, 592 (1944). Two attacks on the con-
stitutionality of the act have failed. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946)
(Congress may allow the states to continue taxing interstate insurance corporations);
Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946) (Congress may allow the states to continue
regulating interstate insurance corporations).
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virtually disappeared with the end of the depression.22 The current wave of
insurance insolvencies, demonstrating reappearance of the problem, accentuates
the continued inability of the states to meet its demands 23 and revitalizes the
congressional opinion expressed in considering the McCarran-Ferguson Act
that federal regulation would be forthcoming if state control proved inade-
quate.
2 4
Federal regulation under the commerce power, through amendment to the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, could achieve equitable distribution of insurance
company assets. 25 The amendment should provide for appointment of a dis-
interested federal receiver, experienced in the field of insurance, with the power
to marshal assets, wherever located.26 The receiver would be appointed by the
federal district court in the state of incorporation or the jurisdiction in which
the principal offices of the company are located.2 7 The domiciliary state's
22. See Comment, 36 MARoQ. L. Rav. 383, 384 (1953). No statistics on the exact
number of insurance insolvencies are available. Letter from Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. to
the Yale Law Journal, May 6, 1957, on file in Yale Law Library. However statistics on
insolvencies in related fields show a startling change between 1940 and 1945, when the
McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed. Over 24,000 bank failures occurred between 1921
and 1940. From 1941 to 1946 only 22 failures took place. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES: 1956, table no. 514. See also id. table no.
532 (savings and loan association failures).
23. The wave of insolvencies started with the liquidation of the Preferred Accident
Insurance Co. of New York in April, 1951. At the date of the liquidation petition Pre-
ferred was doing business in 46 states. See Bennett, supra note 2, at 424. Within the past
three years, over forty Texas insurance companies have collapsed, the biggest failure
coming in February, 1957 when the Insurance Company of Texas was reported to be
hopelessly insolvent. Time, Feb. 18, 1957, p. 92.
The continued inadequacy of state liquidation is particularly evident in Inland Empire
Ins. Co. v. Freed, 239 F.2d 289 (10th Cir. 1956). When Inland was declared insolvent,
the Idaho Superintendent of Insurance was required by statute to liquidate the company.
Admitting his inability to do so under the existing state procedure, he requested the court
to appoint a federal receiver. Brief for Receiver, p. 10, Inland Empire Ins. Co. v. Freed,
supra. For discussion of federal receiverships, see note 11 supra.
24. See 91 CONG. REc. 479, 481, 483, 485, 1478, 1481, 1483, 1486, 1488 (1945). See
also McCarran, Federal Control of Insurance: Moratorium. Under Public Law 15 Expired
Jvulv 1, 34 A.B.A.J. 539, 540 (1948) ; McCarran, Inutrance as Commerce-After Four
Years, 23 NoTmE DAmE LAw. 299, 307 (1948).
25. Dealing with insolvencies through the commerce rather than the bankruptcy power
is supported by recent precedent. Railroad reorganizations, though nominally still under
§ 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1952), are now
handled almost exclusively by the ICC acting under an express amendment to the Inter-
state Commerce Act. 62 STAT. 163 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 20(b) (1952). See Polatsek,
The Wreck of the Old 77, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 532 (1949).
26. Since under the proposed amendment, the receiver's appointment would be re-
quired by federal law, no jurisdictional problem would be presented in securing his ap-
pointment by a federal court. See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See also MOORE,
COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE ff 0.03(22) (1949) ; MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE
166.06 (1956).
27. "The principal place of business or the place where the principal assets are located
is a proper district for the institution of the primary receivership." 7 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRAcTICE ff 66.06 (1956). Cf. Saltz v. Saltz Bros., 84 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1936). Appoint-
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Superintendent of Insurance, the Superintendent of Insurance of any other
state where the company does business or the holder of an unsatisfied judg-
ment would be entitled to petition for such appointment.2 8 Upon determining
the petition's validity, the court would dissolve the corporation and vest title
to its assets in the receiver who would then be recognized in all federal district
courts. 29 And by invalidating judicial liens secured during the company's in-
solvency and within a certain period prior to the date the petition was filed,
the amendment could prevent local creditors from so obtaining more than their
ratable share of the company's assets.3 0
Completely ratable distribution, however, cannot be achieved without modify-
ing the existing system of statutory deposits.31 These deposits comprise fixed
ing the primary receiver in the district of the insolvent's principal office (where the com-
pany directors have their offices and where the bulk of the books and records are located)
allows the receiver at once to take over a large part of the firm's assets as well as most
of its books and records. It prevents tampering with the books and saves the expense of
having to collect them. Brief for Receiver, p. 6, Inland Empire Ins. Co. v. Freed, 239
F.2d 289 (10th Cir. 1956).
28. Allowing the domiciliary state Superintendent of Insurance to petition for appoint-
ment of a primary receiver is in line with current state practice. See, e.g., N.Y. INs. LAW
§ 511; VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-131 (Supp. 1956). Petition by a non-domiciliary Insurance
Superintendent, however, departs from such practice. But since he is likely to be aware
of the company's general financial position through knowledge of its local status, allow-
ing the non-domiciliary Insurance Superintendent to initiate proceedings seems a sound
provision.
Originally only a judgment creditor could petition for the appointment of a federal
receiver. Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U.S. 36, 52 (1928) ; Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen,
261 U.S. 491, 497 (1923). Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), requiring federal
courts to follow state substantive law in cases of diversity jurisdiction, has raised doubt
as to the status of Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, supra. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(b) also casts
doubt on the Pusey doctrine. 7 MooRs, FEDEAuL PRAcTicE fl 66.05(1) (1956). See Inland
Empire Ins. Co. v. Freed, 239 F.2d 289 (10th Cir. 1956). Since the appointment of a
federal receiver would not be based on diversity jurisdiction, see note 26 supra, Congress
would not be bound by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.
29. There are a number of grounds for liquidating an insurance corporation. A typical
list may be found in the N.Y. INs. LAw § 511.
Dissolving the company would eliminate conflict on who holds title to specific assets,
the primary receiver or an ancillary receiver appointed to conserve those particular assets,
by making the primary receiver's title clear. See UILA, Commissioner's Prefatory Note
No. 3.
Federal receivers are presently recognized in all district courts. 62 STAT. 922 (1948),
28 U.S.C. § 754 (1952) ; see note 50 infra.
30. The suggestion follows the pattern of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 STAT. 564 (1898),
as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (1) (1952). The four month period there provided also
appears in UILA § 9. Creditors whose liens are so invalidated should be allowed to file
unsecured claims against the insolvent. Ross v. American Employers' Liab. Ins. Co., 56
NJ. Eq. 41, 38 Atl. 22 (Ch. 1897) ; In the Matter of Empire State Surety Co., 214 N.Y.
553, 108 N.E. 825 (1915). See Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947) ; cf. Bankruptcy Act
§ 57(g), 30 STAT. 560 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 93(g) (1952).
31. The problems of statutory deposits and marshalling of assets are inseparable be-
cause such deposits usually form a good part of the insolvent's assets in foreign jurisdic-




amounts of cash or securities left in trust with a designated state official. In-
surance companies must, in most states, post such a deposit as a prerequisite
to obtaining a corporate charter.32 Many states also require foreign insurance
corporations to meet smaller deposit requirements before being admitted to
do business in the state.33 Deposits by foreign corporations fall into two cate-
gories, general and special, with most states requiring both types.3 4 A general
deposit is designed to protect all policyholders in the United States from the
insurance company's subsequent insolvency.3 5 A special deposit, on the other
hand, is available only to local policyholders and creditors.36 By definition,
then, special deposits place substantial barriers in the way of fully ratable dis-
tribution.37 And since special deposits are generally administered and dis-
tributed by independent state-appointed receivers, 38 they cause an uncoordi-
32. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 73, § 638 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1956); LA. REy. STAT.
ANN. § 22.36 (Supp. 1956); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.290 (Supp. 1956). A deposit by a
domestic insurance company is regarded in most states as a trust fund for the benefit of
all policyholders and creditors, wherever resident. 19 APPLEMIAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 10488 (1946). See McMurray v. Commonwealth, 249 Mass. 574, 144 N.E. 718
(1924). The deposit will be surrendered to the primary receiver or the court when the
company is declared insolvent. See Hobbs v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 87 F.2d 380, 384
(10th Cir. 1937). Many states accept a surety bond in lieu of cash or security deposit.
See, e.g., TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 6.09 (Supp. 1956) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-108 (Supp.
1956).
33. For the deposits required of foreign and alien surety and casualty insurance com-
panies by every state and territory, see ASSOCIATION OF CASUALTY AND SuREr CoM-
PANIES, MULTIPLE LINE UNDERWRITING (1950).
34. Ibid.
35. Creditors are usually not beneficiaries of these statutory deposit trusts. Cf.
American United Life Ins. Co. v. Fischer, 130 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1942). See also 19
APPLE1IAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACrICE § 11096 (1946). But see MAINE REV. STAT.
ANN. c. 60, § 50 (1954) (creditors share on a par With policyholders).
36. See ASSOCIATION OF CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANIES, MULTIPLE LINE UNDER-
WRITING (1950). Usually both classes share on a par. Virginia, however, gives local
policyholders some preference over local creditors. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-110 (Supp.
1956).
37. Bennett, supra note 2, at 426-27.
Ratable distribution has also been precluded by judicial interpretation of deposit laws.
Thus, in Ohio, a general deposit was turned into a special deposit by court decision. The
Ohio statute had originally provided that the beneficiaries of the statutory deposit trust
be resident policyholders. Act of April 24, 1873, 70 OHIO LAWs 152. By amendment the
legislature changed the beneficiaries to all policyholders of the company. Act of April 15,
1904, 97 Omo LAWS 154. The court held the legislature still intended the deposit to be
held for the benefit of Ohio policyholders. State ex rel. Turner v. Union Cas. Ins. Co., 8
Ohio App. 285, 292 (1917). The current Ohio statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3929.07
(Page Supp. 1956), provides that beneficiaries shall be all policyholders and is still con-
strued as being only for the benefit of Ohio policyholders. State ex tel. Bohlnge'r v. Annat,
68 Ohio L. Abs. 453, 123 N.E.2d 71 (C.P. 1954).
38. Hankins v. Sallard, 188 So. 411 (La. App. 1939) ; Phillips v. Perue, 111 Tex. 112,
229 S.W. 849 (1921). See also Cooke v. Warner, 56 Conn. 234, 14 Atl. 798 (1888). But
see Holloway v. Federal Reserve Life Ins. Co., 21 F. Supp. 516 (W.D. Mo. 1937) (when
the insolvent's obligations have been completely reinsured, reinsurer obtains deposit with-
out need of local receiver). The fund is generally held by the State Treasurer and dis-
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nated distribution as well as the unnecessary additional expense of multiple
administration.39 Thus, unlike general deposits which may be justified as
providing needed protection for all policyholders, 40 special deposits hinder the
basic aims of insolvency proceedings by favoring local interests and increasing
the expense of liquidation.4 1
A federal law creating a uniform system of state statutory deposits would
provide the necessary protection to policyholders without precluding ratable
distribution or impairing the efficiency of insolvency proceedings.4 2 An intra-
tributed by the State Superintendent of Insurance or a private receiver. Cf. Continental
Bank and Trust Co. v. Apodaca, 239 F.2d 295, 296 (10th Cir. 1956). The primary receiver
does not take control of these deposits because they are not considered part of the general
assets of the insolvent, but a trust fund for the benefit of the beneficiaries designated by
statute. Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 257 (1898); Boston & A.R.R. v. Mercantile
Trust and Deposit Co., 82 Md. 535, 34 Atl. 778 (1896) ; In re New Jersey Fidelity and
Plate Glass Ins. Co., 15 N.J. Misc. 384, 191. Atl. 475 (Ch. 1937) ; Phillips v. Perue,
supra; GLENN, LIQUIDATION § 599; Vance, supra note 1, at 351. To the same effect is
Continental Bank and Trust Co.- v. Gold, 140 F. Supp. 252 (E.D.N.C. 1956). But see
Continent Bank and Trust Co. v. Apodaca, supra (statutory deposit a general asset of the
insolvent).
39. Since the domicilary receiver is supposed to distribute the assets of the company
on a ratable basis, creditors and policyholders who have realized part of their claims out
of a special deposit are not entitled to share in the distribution until other policyholders
and creditors have received an equal percentage of their claim. American Bonding & Cas.
Co. v. Chicago Bonding & Ins. Co., 251 Ill. App. 549 (1929). See also 2 BEALE, COrLICT
OF LAWS § 264.4 (1935). Contra Matter of People (Southern Surety Co.), 282 N.Y. 54,
24 N.E.2d 845 (1939) (overruled by N.Y. INS. LAW § 545.2). The domiciliary liquidator
must coordinate his distribution with that made out of every special deposit fund, a pro-
cedure entailing additional administration costs. See PAxTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSUR-
ANcE LAW 19 (1935) ; Bennett, supra note 2, at 426-27.
UILA, even if fully adopted, would -not solve this problem for it accepts the state
statutory deposit system. UILA § 7.
40. See note 35 supra.
41. The insurance industry itself disfavors special deposit laws. For they disperse
the insurance company's assets throughout the country and thereby place artificial restric-
tions on the corporation's ability to handle its investment portfolio. Letter from Robert
N. Gilmore, Jr., Associate Counsel, Association of Casualty and Surety Companies, to the
Yale Law Journal, April 16, 1957, on file in Yale Law Library. The industry's objection
does not extend to general deposits because many states now instead accept a certificate
issued by any other state that the required amount, there on deposit, is held for the benefit
of all policyholders of the company. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-113 (Supp. 1956) ;
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.05.080(2) (1951). The deposit is usually made in the cor-
poration's domiciliary state which issues the required certificate. Some state statutes pro-
vide for voluntary deposits and issuance of the required certificates so that domiciliary
corporations can comply with the deposit requirements of foreign states. See N.Y. INs.
LAW § 100; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 181 (Purdon Supp. 1956).
42. An analogous system handling deposits by face-amount certificate companies is
currently utilized. 54 STAT. 835 (1940), 11 U.S.C. § 107(f) (1952). The system recog-
nizes the importance of state deposits but eliminates multiple administration by giving
power over their disposition to the trustee in bankruptcy. See COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY
ffff 67.50, 67.53 (1956).
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state insurance company would, of course, continue to be subject to the statu-
tory deposit requirements of its own state. Upon qualifying to do business in
other states, however, the company would become subject to a federal law
requiring an additional fixed basic deposit with the state treasurer of its domi-
ciliary state.43 This deposit would be increased by further deposits each time
the firm was admitted to do business in a new state,44 with the size of the
main and subsidiary deposits based on current state practice. 45 In case of in-
solvency, the fund would be administered by the primary receiver handling
the general assets of the firm.46 The beneficiaries of this fund would, consistent
with the theory of general deposits, be all United States policyholders of the
corporation. While so retaining the main substantive provisions of existing
state law, this system of statutory deposits would eliminate the multiple
administration of assets and favoritism toward local interests inherent in
special deposits. Its use in the proposed amendment to the McCarran-Ferguson
Act would, therefore, assure the achievement of ratable distribution and
facilitate resolution of the major problems that have plagued insurance liquida-
tions. 47
The proposed amendment has the further advantage of enabling more per-
sons to prove their claims, a recurrent, though secondary, problem in insur-
ance liquidations. Currently, small claims are often dropped when local assets
are insufficient to pay the cost of a local ancillary receivership proceeding, and
the cost of proving such claims in a distant state is greater than their expected
realization.48  Under the existing system, the domiciliary receiver generally
cannot hold proceedings outside the state of his appointment. Hence, proceed-
ings will be held elsewhere only on the appointment of an ancillary receiver,
43. All states require foreign insurance corporations to comply with certain require-
ments before admitting them to do business. See, e.g., S.C. CODE § 37.107 (Supp. 1956).
See also 29 Am. JUR., Insurance § 34 (1940). Thus, the determination that a company
has qualified to do business in another state can be easily made.
44. Concentration of all statutory deposits in one state should overcome the insurance
industry's objection to special statutory deposits. See note 41 supra.
45. The deposit requirements should vary, as under the present system, depending on
the type of insurance the firm writes. See AssoCIATIOx OF CASUALTY AND SURETY Coi-
IANIES, MULTIPLE LINE UNDERWRITIxG (1950). Thus, a burial or title insurance com-
pany would not have to make as large a deposit as a life or casualty company because of
the difference in number and size of claims normally filed upon insolvency.
The proposed amendment should, in accord with current practice, include a provision
allowing the corporation to substitute securities in the deposit fund, thus increasing the
corporation's ability to manipulate its investments. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 511.8(13)
(Supp. 1956) ; N.Y. INs. LAW § 98(5).
46. See note 38 supra.
47. The amendment should include a provision for secured claims. A secured creditor
should be allowed to waive his security and file as an unsecured creditor or to realize on
the security and file an unsecured claim for any balance. See UILA, § 8. See, generally,
GLENN, LIQUIDATION c. 36 (1935).
48. Comment, 36 AIARQQ. L. REV. 383, 386 (1953). Cf. UILA, Commissioner's Pre-
fatory Note No. 4.
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a costly and unnecessary procedure.49 On the other hand, the federal receiver
contemplated by the proposed amendment must be recognized in any district
court.50 He can therefore hold ancillary proceedings himself if this should
prove less expensive than the appointment of a local representative.51 Small
claims would thus not have to be abandoned, and the general depletion of
the insolvent's assets in administrative costs would be reduced.
While achieving ratable distribution and minimizing costs, federal liquida-
tion of insurance corporations would have to meet the question of claim prior-
ities. A provision for claim priorities like that of the Bankruptcy Act might
dispose of the difficulties. 2 Although such a solution has the advantage of
simplicity, it necessarily overlooks valid policy differences among the states.
53
49. Comment, 36 MARQ. L. Rzv. 383, 387 (1953). The usual requirement is that the
State Superintendent of Insurance or a private party be appointed as ancillary receiver
for an insolvent foreign insurance company. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.12 (Supp.
1956); UILA § 3. See also Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, 262 U.S. 77, 87
(1923) ; GOODRICr, CoN.rIcT OF LAWS § 202 (1949).
Some states require the appointment of a private, compensated receiver. See, e.g.,
TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.28, § 13 (Supp. 1956); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3353 (1955).
In many states, however, the receiver is not specially compensated since he is the state
Superintendent of Insurance. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 505.9 (Supp. 1956) ; UILA
§ 3(1). It may be argued that a federal receivership would be more costly because of the
additional salary. See Comment, 36 MARQ. L. Rzv. 383, 390 (1953). However, overall
administration cost is reduced by a centralized federal receivership. See Brief for Receiver,
p. 7, Inland Empire Ins. Co. v. Freed, 239 F.2d 289 (10th Cir. 1956).
50. 62 STAT. 922 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 754 (1952). Prior to 1948, the Judicial Code
provided that a federal receiver had standing only in the district courts within the judicial
circuit of the appointing district court and then only with regard to fixed property. 36
STAT. 1102 (1911.). Thus where fixed property was involved, ancillary appointment was
necessary only in districts outside the judicial circuit of the appointing court. 7 MOORE,
FEDERAL PRAcTiCE ff 66.08 (1956). But insurance company assets were not considered
fixed property. Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz, 262 U.S. 77, 87 (1923). Until 1948,
therefore, a federal equity receiver for an insurance company had to obtain an ancillary
receivership in every district in which the insolvent's assets were located, whether within
or without the judicial circuit. 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcricE supra. The 1948 revision
resolved the problem by extending federal receivership to all property, fixed or not, and
by giving the receiver capacity to sue in any district court without ancillary appointment.
62 STAT. 922 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 754 (1952). See also Revisor's Note following 28 U.S.
C.A. § 754 (Supp. 1956).
51. The primary receiver should have discretion to determine the need for appointing
an ancillary receiver. However, Congress should make ancillary proccedings mandatory
where a given number of creditors, desiring to prove claims, petition for such proceedings
in their jurisdiction. UILA § 3, for example, requires ancillary proceedings to be held
on petition of ten or more creditors. If less than the required number of creditors petition,
proceedings should be at the discretion of the primary receiver.
52. Bankruptcy Act § 64, 30 STAT. 563 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1952).
53. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 175, § 46 (Supp. 1956) (unreimbursed policy-
holder losses receive priority over claims for unearned premiums on cancelled or unexpired
policies) ; Kelsey v. Cogswell, 112 Fed. 599, 606 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1901) (same construction
given Georgia statute).
Claims of injured workmen are given varying degrees of priority over claims of other
policyholders and creditors. See, e.g., CAL. LAa. CODE ANN. § 4908 (Deering Supp. 1955) ;
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These differences could be recognized, and a degree of uniformity effected,
by giving priority to the claims preferred in all states-state taxes, wages,
debts and taxes due the United States and administration expenses-while
leaving subsequent priorities to state discretion.54 Thus assets remaining after
distribution in accordance with the federal priorities would be allocated to
each state in the proportion that the claims of its residents bear to the total
amount of claims filed. The assets so allocated would then be distributed by
the federal receiver according to the individual state priority laws.55 In giving
effect to the valid policy differences among the states, this system of priorities
should temper the traditional reluctance of Congress to dictate to the states in
the field of insurance.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.23 (Supp. 1956); MASS. ANN. LAws c. 175, § 46A (Supp. 1956);
N.Y. WORKMEN'S Comp. LAW § 34. The theory is that an injured workman is least able
to bear the hardships created by the insurer's insolvency. Van Schaick, Should Insolvent
Insurance Companies be Administered in Bankruptcy?, A2 CoRPoRATE REORGANIZATIONS
227, 228 (1939). But this hardship will arise only if the workman is subsequently unable
to collect from his employer since the insolvency of the insurer cannot relieve the em-
ployer from liability for the injury. American Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm., 55 Utah 483,
187 Pac. 633 (1920). Therefore, in many cases the effect of this priority will be to protect
the employer rather than the employee.
If workmen's compensation claims are to be given priority, Congress should treat them
in the same manner as wages, taxes, debts due the United States and administrative ex-
penses. See note 54 infra. For it appears inequitable to allow injured workmen in one state
to collect their claims in full while those in another state receive only a small percentage.
See Vance, Interstate Aspects of the Liquidation of Insolvent Insurance Corporations, 6
AssocIATioN OF LirE INSURANCE CouNsEl. PRocEEDINGs 343, 352-53 (1935). Under the
UILA the priority system of the state of incorporation is controlling. UILA § 6. Thus,
either all workmen's compensation claims will have priority or none will, the result
depending on the entirely fortuitous circumstance of the insolvent's choice of domicile.
The law of the jurisdiction where the accident took place is irrelevant. See UILA, Com-
missioner's Prefatory Note No. 5.
54. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE ANN. § 1033 (Deering Supp. 1955); CAL. LAB. CODE ANN.
§ 100.5 (Deering Supp. 1955). See also GLENN, LIQUIDATION §§ 513, 514, 518, 555 (1935)
(state taxes, debts due the United States, wages and administrative expenses respectively).
Under present law, debts due the United States have first priority in insolvency pro-
ceeding not under the Bankruptcy Act. REV. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1952).
See Kennebec Box Co. v. 0. S. Richards Corp., 5 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1925) (administration
expenses, although not specifically mentioned in the statute, to be paid first). Under the
Bankruptcy Act, debts due the United States have fifth priority. 30 STAT. 563 (1898),
as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (5) (1952). Section 3466 priorities have been the subject
of severe criticism. See, e.g., Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government:
The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905 (1954). In
enacting the proposed amendment to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, therefore, Congress
may be well advised to give debts due the United States the same priority as given by the
Bankruptcy Act.
55. Thus, assume that after payment of administration expenses, taxes, wages and
debts due the United States, $100,000 in assets remain and $500,000 in claims must still
be satisfied. Of these claims $50,000 (10%) were filed by creditors residing in State X.
10/ of the $100,000, or $10,000, would therefore go to creditors in State X. The federal
receiver would distribute this $10,000 in accordance with the priority laws of State X.
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Moreover, the proposed amendment to the McCarran-Ferguson Act will
result in an equitable and uniform distribution without jeopardizing state con-
trol of insurance or congressional policy against allowing insurance companies
to go through bankruptcy. The amendment would operate entirely within the
framework of state regulation and the existing court system. No new federal
agency would be necessary, and the federal government would not incur any
additional expense.56 The only major change would be the elimination of state
policy favoring local interests, since postponement of the receiver's claims
could no longer be effected, and special deposits would be non-existent.5T Use
of initial federal priorities will, of course, provide a measure of uniformity in
the distribution of the insolvent corporation's assets. And recognition of sub-
sequent state priorities does not depart from the aim of equitable distribution.
While the order in which their claims will be paid remains a matter of in-
dividual state policy, creditors and policyholders of all states can expect satis-
faction measured by their proportional representation of the total claims rather
than a fortuitous location of assets.
56. The receiver's fee would be paid out of the insolvent's assets, not government
funds. See GLENN, LIQumATIoN § 555 (1935).
57. See text at notes 28-29, 46-47 supra.
The public interest may be better served by federal regulation of insurance not confined
to liquidation. For example, the FTC has asserted jurisdiction over certain insurance mail
advertising practices following state failure to regulate that phase of the industry effec-
tively. American Hospital and Life Ins. Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 25954 (FTC
1956), petition for review filed, 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11 26114. Cf. United States v.
Sylvanus, 192 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1951). See also Business Week, May 25, 1956, p. 152.
Recent developments in Texas demonstrate the need for further federal regulation. The
Insurance Department of that state has been accused of extensive corruption. Harpers,
March, 1957, p. 68. And over forty Texas insurance companies have become insolvent in
the past three years. Time, Feb. 18, 1957, p. 92.
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